A systematic effort to rethink Freud's theory of the unconscious, aiming to separate out the different forms of unconsciousness.

Heidegger foi um dos pensadores mais influentes do século pasado. Muitas de suas contribuições conceituais têm sido aplicadas tanto às ciências humanas quanto às naturais. Dasein, ser-no-mundo, facticidade, sentido, cuidado, etc. são familiares a qualquer filósofo. Neste trabalho tento reconstruir duas das noções centrais do jovem Heidegger. Analiso parte do camino que leva o jovem Heidegger às noções nucleares da grande obra de 1927: “significatividade” e “mundo”. Meu interesse é duplo: em primeiro lugar buscar uma clarificação progressiva destes conceitos e, (...) em segundo lugar, exibir a gênese de Ser e Tempo. Anima-me a ideia de que o modo de tratamento destes conceitos nestes anos ilumina grande parte do pensamento heideggeriano e, com ele, do século XX. Palavras-chave: Heidegger. Significatividade. Mundo. (shrink)

El problema de la libertad es uno de los más áridos de la filosofía. Paul Ricoeur intenta reconstruir el problema tomando el eje del análisis: la naturaleza dicotómica de los discursos sostenidos sobre la cuestión. De un lado, tenemos la “perspectiva de la tercera persona”. Desde esta mirada, cada acto que realizamos está causalmente determinada. Por el otro lado, tenemos la “perspectiva de la tercera persona”, en la que todas nuestras acciones libres parecieran brotar del “yo”. El problema comienza cuando (...) intentamos reconciliar ambas perspectivas. Este trabajo revisará algunos de los argumentos presentados por ambos lados, y el posicionamiento de Ricoeur en el debate. (shrink)

Del Ser a la Palabra es una recopilación de artículos que transitan unos cuarenta años de reflexión filosófica. El eje temático es la experiencia estética, su urgencia, su densidad y relevancia para la existencia. En este trabajo me arriesgo a analizar algunos de los conceptos centrales del texto. Desde luego, muchos quedarán de lado. El recorrido comienza con un sobrevuelo del concepto husserliano de Lebenswelt, y culmina con un análisis de la catarsis (su relación con la retórica y la hermenéutica). (...) En el medio me detendré, brevemente, en el aspecto de nuestra existencia que torna necesaria a la experiencia estética. En otras palabras, la experiencia estética viene a colmar una carencia estructural del hombre, por lo que conviene articular (hacer sentir) dicha carencia. Luego de una breve estadía en la idea del arte como recuperación y retorno, me vuelco a dos de las nociones sobre las que Presas insiste: la mímesis y la catarsis. De la primera destaco dos cosas: el efecto que tiene sobre la temporalidad, y la rehabilitación del poder de la aisthesis. Con respecto a la catarsis, la pongo en relación con la noción retórica del flectere y con la noción jurídica y teológica de applicatio. (shrink)

Este trabajo se enmarca dentro de las innumerables vindicaciones de la poesía. Comienza con el desarrollo de las cuatro características del “lenguaje poético” en tanto “lenguaje denso”. La figuratividad o metaforicidad, su alusividad, la identidad forma-contenido y el realismo poético. En el segundo apartado se analizan estas características a la luz de las categorías de “significatividad” y de “interpretante”. La ontología heideggeriana y la semiótica peirceana enriquecen el concepto de lenguaje denso y aclaran su poder epistémico. Finalmente, analizo algunos aspectos (...) que Nietzsche, en su período retórico, elabora sobre el lenguaje, y que prefiguran y amplían la noción de lenguaje denso. Me centro allí en la idea que todo lenguaje es, en su origen, retórica, y en el modo en que el proceso comunicativo atenta contra dicho origen. Me interesan, en particular, las nociones de “fijación”, “olvido” y “restauración”. (shrink)

La cuestión de la identidad personal ha sido muy discutida durante los últimos años. La atención puesta sobre este problema es una clara evidencia de la relevancia que tiene, entre otros, para el ámbito práctico en general. En este horizonte, Habermas y Tugendhat han sostenido una larga e interesante polémica sobre el concepto de identidad personal, polémica no siempre bien dimensionada. Esta querella ha servido para clarificar las diferentes variables que ingresan en esta problemática. En este trabajo analizaré críticamente cada (...) una de las posturas con la finalidad de advertir el corazón argumental, buscar elementos en común y subrayar las insalvables diferencias. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo analizo algunos de los argumentos clásicos que la tradición retórica contrapone al discurso filosófico. Para ello, comienzo sobrevolando las características que definen al discurso filosófico de filiación platónico-cartesiana, y que son relevantes para la querella con la retórica. Luego intento elaborar un ataque en dos frentes. Por un lado, me detengo en la rehabilitación de la doxa como elemento vital del discurso práctico, en contra de la depreciación a que se ve sometida bajo el enfoque universalista (...) de la filosofía. Luego, tomando como base la noción de sentido común, analizo la idea de "auditorio", esencial para la retórica, y la consiguiente pluralidad de esferas de validez que conlleva. Dicha pluralidad horizontal contrasta con el monismo verticalista del discurso filosófico. Finalmente, en la conclusión dejo abierto uno de los problemas más urgentes de este movimiento pluralista que propone la retórica.In this paper I analyze some classical arguments used by rhetorical tradition to oppose philosophical discourse. To do this, I give a brief account of the characteristics defining the philosophical discourse of Platonic-Cartesian affiliation that are relevant for the dispute with Rhetoric. Then, on the one hand, I dwell upon the rehabilitation of doxa as a vital element of practical discourse in order to countering the downgrading of doxa by the universalistic approach of philosophy. On the other hand, based on the notion of common sense, I analyze the idea of "audience", essential for Rhetoric, as well as the resulting plurality of spheres of validity. This horizontal plurality contrasts with the vertical monism of philosophical discourse. Finally, in the conclusion I point out one of the most urgent problems of this pluralistic movement that rhetoric has proposed. (shrink)

Sport is an emotional experience. Studies have shown that high emotional intelligence (EI) is associated with better sports performance, though different aspects of sports experience and their relationship with EI are still unclear. This study examined the possible relationships between sports experience and EI dimensions of undergraduate athletes. Likewise, according to the differences described in the literature between men and women, the secondary aim was to identify the possible relationship between EI and sports experience in both subgroups. A total of (...) 1784 [712 men (39.9%), 1072 women (60.1%); mean age = 21.3 years, SD = 4.2)] undergraduate athletes completed the Trait Meta Mood Scale and a sports experience questionnaire. Comparisons between groups were performed using Mann–Whitney-Uand H-Kruskal–Wallis tests and correlations between variables were analyzed using Spearman correlation. We found that the number of different sports practiced and the number of years practicing sports were positively associated with emotional repair (ER). However, the number of years practicing sports was negatively associated with emotional attention (EA). Male athletes who trained more and had a higher competitive level were more likely to show higher ER. In any case, it is necessary to take into account that all the associations were weak. Our study suggested that athletes tend to attend to and value their feelings and use positive thinking to repair their negative moods. (shrink)

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich knowledge of the empathic experience of pain by using an experimental phenomenological method. Method: (...) Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main-themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. Temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory for non-interactive social experience. (shrink)

El jesuita morisco P. Ignacio de las Casas colaboró en la traducción de algunos de los libros plúmbeos encontrados en Granada a fines del siglo XVI. Inicialmente se manifestó partidario de su autenticidad, pero pronto se convenció de que eran una falsificación. Desarrolló entonces una activa lucha para conseguir que la Iglesia evitara su divulgación. En el artículo se pasa revista a su intervención como traductor y a los argumentos que utilizó para criticar la doctrina de los libros plúmbeos. (...) El P. Las Casas, además de señalar la presencia de elementos islámicos, ve en ellos claras muestras de antiguas herejías antitrinitarias. Aunque no los considera obra de moriscos, señala el atractivo que el mesianismo y milenarismo contenidos en la doctrina de los libros plúmbeos tenía para los moriscos. (shrink)

Resumen: En este ensayo discuto la crítica de John Campbell a la tesis de la inescrutabilidad de la referencia de Quine. Primero defiendo que los argumentos de Campbell no dan en el blanco, pues él pasa por alto la conexión que Quine traza entre referencia, cuantificación, y ontología. Luego discuto otra línea de argumentación contra la inescrutabilidad que invoca la concepción relacional de la atención de Campbell. Finalmente, sugiero que esta línea –aunque insuficiente y necesitada de complemento– pone de (...) manifiesto que tras las posturas de ambos autores sobre la referencia hay importantes ideales filosóficos hacia los cuales debe dirigirse la discusión. (shrink)

En este ensayo discuto la crítica de John Campbell a la tesis de la inescrutabilidad de la referencia de Quine. Primero defiendo que los argumentos de Campbell no dan en el blanco, pues él pasa por alto la conexión que Quine traza entre referencia, cuantificación, y ontología. Luego discuto otra línea de argumentación contra la inescrutabilidad que invoca la concepción relacional de la atención de Campbell. Finalmente, sugiero que esta línea –aunque insuficiente y necesitada de complemento– pone de manifiesto (...) que tras las posturas de ambos autores sobre la referencia hay importantes ideales filosóficos hacia los cuales debe dirigirse la discusión. (shrink)

"Soy un ciudadano ejemplar. Voto siempre cada cuatro años... veo diariamente los programas del corazón en la tele y los sábados el fútbol... pago todos mis impuestos... tengo una cuenta en Facebook con muchos amigos que no conozco; hago mis compras en una gran superficie de consumo con mi tarjeta de crédito... no me meto con nadie... aunque esto de los inmigrantes no sé, no sé... opino en todo lo que opina la mayoría... que puede que venga a quitarnos nuestro (...) trabajo... este año cambiaré de coche... no doy problemas a las autoridades y en el trabajo procuro no tener problemas: obedezco y punto... En definitiva, cuando me miro al espejo por las mañanas me digo a mí mismo: soy un ciudadano ejemplar". "... se enfrascó tanto en las procelosas aguas de Internet que se le pasaban las noches conectado de claro en claro, y los días de turbio en turbio delante de su televisor; y así, del poco dormir y del mucho ver, se le secó el cerebro de manera que vino a perder el juicio. Llenósele la fantasía de todo aquello que veía en las pantallas, así de promesas falsas de la publicidad, como de zafiedades, pendencias, promesas falsas de los políticos, amoríos, mentiras, temores y disparates imposibles; y asentósele de tal modo en la imaginación que era verdad toda aquella maquinaria de soñadas invenciones que veía que para él no había otra historia más cierta en el mundo". "... Y Circe alimentó las mentes de todas aquellas criaturas y sus mentes quedaron en blanco, sin sustancia y sin sentido. A partir de entonces, el control del pensamiento fue el arte de la democracia porque, antes, en las dictaduras, se domesticaban los cuerpos a base de latigazos, y desde entonces se domesticaron las almas a base de imágenes". (shrink)

Freud’s fascination with the ruins of ancient Rome was an element in the formation and development of psychology. This article concerns the intersection of psychoanalysis with archaeology and history in the study of that city. Its substantive content is an analysis of the life and career of Andrea Carandini, the best-known Roman archaeologist of the past 40 years. He has said and written much about his changing views of himself and about what he is trying to do in his approach (...) to the recuperation of the Roman past. His scholarly publications and autobiographical testimonies are at the core of this article. After an early commitment to Marxism that ended in disenchantment and a crisis in his personal life, Carandini spent a decade undergoing psychoanalysis with the Chilean-born expatriate Ignacio Matte-Blanco. The latter gained a following as a theorist who built upon Freud’s ideas about the unconscious by producing a set of mathematically inspired concepts concerning the workings of temporality in human history in which emotional intuition took priority over the rational(izing) logic of empiricism. Much influenced by his psychoanalyst, Carandini developed a highly personal approach to the writing of archaeology and history. These writings are explored here in terms of Roman historiography, and in the wider arena of formulations of how the past is to be addressed and written about. (shrink)

This book explores the clinical processes of psychoanalysis by charting modern developments in logic and applying them to the study of insight. Offering an epistemic approach to clinical psychoanalysis this book places value on the clinical interpretations of both the analysand and analyst and engages in a critique on purely linguistic approaches to psychoanalysis, which forsake crucial dimensions of clinical practice. Drawing on the work of key twentieth century thinkers including Jerome Richfield, Ignacio Matte-Blanco, Gregory Bateson and (...) the pioneering contribution on insight made by James Strachey, topics of discussion include: the structure and role of clinical interpretation interpretation and creationism body, meaning and language logical levels and transference. As such, this book will be of great interest to all those in the psychoanalytic field, in particular those wanting to learn more about the study of insight and its relationship to clinical processes of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Eric Rayner, a psychoanalyst in private practice, has written the first clear introduction to Matte-Blanco's key concepts for psychotherapists and psychoanalysts. While Matte-Blanco's theories on the structure of the unconscious and the way in which it operates are generally recognized to be the most original since those of Freud, many people find his use of terminology from mathematics and logic difficult to understand. In this book, Rayner sets out the central ideas and then shows, with examples, (...) how they relate to clinical practice. He also describes how the ideas are related to those of people in other disciplines--mathematics, logic, psychology (specifically Piaget), and anthropology, among others. Drawing on the work of a group of people who have been inspired by Matte-Blanco's thinking to extend their own ideas and test them out in the consulting room, this book reveals the significance of Matte-Blanco's thought for future research. (shrink)

Both utilitarian and deontological moral theories locate the source of our moral beliefs in the wrong sorts of considerations. One way this failure manifests itself, we argue, is in the ways these theories analyze the proper human relationship toward the non-human environment. Another, more notorious, manifestation of this failure is found in Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion. Our goal is to explore the connection between these two failures, and to suggest that they are failures of act-centered moral theories in general. As (...) such, they cannot be fixed by simply developing a better version of such a theory. Virtue-based theories, we suggest, provide a more promising alternative. (shrink)

The Reliability Challenge to moral non-naturalism has received substantial attention recently in the literature on moral epistemology. While the popularity of this particular challenge is a recent development, the challenge has a long history, as the form of this challenge can be traced back to a skeptical challenge in the philosophy of mathematics raised by Paul Benacerraf. The current Reliability Challenge is widely regarded as the most sophisticated way to develop this skeptical line of thinking, making the Reliability Challenge the (...) strongest epistemic challenge to normative nonnaturalism. In this paper, I argue that the innovations that have occurred since Benacerraf’s statement of the challenge are misconceived and confused in a number of ways. The Reliability Challenge is not the most potent epistemic challenge to moral non-naturalism. The most potent challenge comes from the fact that there is a causal condition on knowledge – or, more precisely, a becaual condition – that non-natural moral facts cannot satisfy. (shrink)

I argue that there is a wide variety of epistemic norms, distributed along two different spectra. One spectrum runs from the ideal to the practical and concerns the extent to which it is possible to follow the norm given our cognitive and epistemic limitations. The other spectrum runs from thin to thick and concerns the extent to which the norm concerns facts about our beliefs over and above the content of the belief. Many putative epistemic norms, such as truth and (...) various conceptions of justification, can be found at different points on the spectra. There is no single obvious privileged point from which to say any of these norms is more fundamental than the others, though there may be some reason to doubt that some of the norms are intrinsically interesting. (shrink)

RESUMEN La neurociencia ha proporcionado valiosas herramientas para analizar problemas filosóficos; sin embargo, el debate sobre el papel de las evidencias neurocientíficas en la explicación de determinados fenómenos mentales sigue abierto. La discusión se centra en la experiencia mística y sus bases neuronales, lo que permite efectuar consideraciones más genéricas acerca de la legitimidad y el alcance de los razonamientos neurocientíficos cuando versan sobre algunos de los más conspicuos productos de la cultura. ABSTRACT Neuroscience has provided valuable tools for the (...) analysis of philosophical problems; however, there is an ongoing debate over the role of neuroscientific evidence in the explanation of certain mental phenomena. The discussion focuses on the mystical experience and its neuronal bases, which makes it possible to carry out more generic considerations regarding the legitimacy and scope of neuroscientific arguments when they involve some of the principal cultural products. (shrink)

The standard view of honesty is a subjectivist one, according to which honesty concerns the facts merely “as the agent sees them”. Against this view, the present paper argues for a non-subjectivist view of honesty. It argues, in particular, that ideal honesty requires not merely expressing what one believes to be true but, moreover, expressing what is true. In that case, though one can be honest to an extent while merely expressing what one believes to be true, one cannot be (...) ideally honest without expressing the truth. (shrink)

The Skillfulness of Virtue provides a new framework for understanding virtue as a skill, based on psychological research on self-regulation and expertise. Matt Stichter lays the foundations of his argument by bringing together theories of self-regulation and skill acquisition, which he then uses as grounds to discuss virtue development as a process of skill acquisition. This account of virtue as skill has important implications for debates about virtue in both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Furthermore, it engages seriously with criticisms (...) of virtue theory that arise in moral psychology, as psychological experiments reveal that there are many obstacles to acting and thinking well, even for those with the best of intentions. Stichter draws on self-regulation strategies and examples of deliberate practice in skill acquisition to show how we can overcome some of these obstacles, and become more skillful in our moral and epistemic virtues. (shrink)

It seems like experience plays a positive—even essential—role in generating some knowledge. The problem is, it’s not clear what that role is. To see this, suppose that when your visual system takes in information about the world around you it skips the experience step and just automatically and immediately generates beliefs in you about your surroundings. A lot of philosophers think that, in such a case, you would (or at least could) still know, via perception, about the world around you. (...) But then that raises the question: What epistemic role was the experience playing? How did it contribute to your knowledge of your surroundings? Philosophers have given many different answers to these questions. But, for various reasons, none of them has really stuck. In this paper I offer and defend a different answer to these questions—a solution to the problem—which avoids the pitfalls of other answers. I argue that experience is, all by itself, a kind of knowledge—it’s what Bertrand Russell (1912) calls “knowledge of things”. So I argue that experience helps generate knowledge simply by being knowledge. (shrink)

Since its resurgence in the 1990s, character education has been subject to a bevy of common criticisms, including that it is didactic and crudely behaviorist; premised on a faulty trait psychology; victim‐blaming; culturally imperialist, racist, religious, or ideologically conservative; and many other horrible things besides. Matt Ferkany and Benjamin Creed examine an intellectualist Aristotelian form of character education that has gained popularity recently and find that it is largely not susceptible to such criticisms. In this form, character education is education (...) for practically intelligent virtue, or the intrinsically motivated and psychically harmonious exercise of robust and stable traits involving practical intelligence conducive to individual and collective human flourishing. (shrink)

When we experience the world – see, hear, feel, taste, or smell things – we gain all sorts of knowledge about the things around us. And this knowledge figures heavily in our reasoning about the world – about what to think and do in response to it. But what is the nature of this knowledge? On one commonly held view, all knowledge is constituted by beliefs in propositions. But in this paper I argue against this view. I argue that some (...) knowledge is constituted, not by beliefs in propositions, but by awareness of properties and objects. To make my case, I focus on the role of visual perception in reasoning. I start by introducing a principle about the relationship between knowledge and reasoning, which says that to learn something new by reasoning, one must know the bases of one’s reasoning. Then I argue that in some cases of genuine, knowledge-conferring reasoning, the bases of our reasoning are not propositions that we believe; rather, they’re properties or objects that we see. Thus, I conclude that some such knowledge is non-propositional and is rather what some call “knowledge of things”. (shrink)

Subjectivity is that feature of consciousness whereby there is something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience. One persistent challenge in the study of consciousness is to explain how subjectivity relates to, or arises from, purely physical brain processes. But, in order to address this challenge, it seems we must have a clear explanation of what subjectivity is in the first place. This has proven challenging in its own right. For the nature of subjectivity itself seems to (...) resist straightforward characterization. In this paper, I won't address how subjectivity relates to the physical. Instead, I'll address subjectivity itself. I'll do this by introducing and defending a model of subjectivity based on self-acquaintance. My model does not purport to reduce, eliminate, or naturalize subjectivity, but it does make subjectivity more tractable, less paradoxical, and perhaps less dubious to those averse to obscurity. (shrink)

This paper argues that a sweatshop worker's choice to accept the conditions of his or her employment is morally significant, both as an exercise of autonomy and as an expression of preference. This fact establishes a moral claim against interference in the conditions of sweatshop labor by third parties such as governments or consumer boycott groups. It should also lead us to doubt those who call for MNEs to voluntarily improve working conditions, at least when their arguments are based on (...) the claim that workers have a moral right to such improvement. These conclusions are defended against three objections: 1) that sweatshop workers' consent to the conditions of their labor is not fully voluntary, 2) that sweatshops' offer of additional labor options is part of an overall package that actually harms workers, 3) that even if sweatshop labor benefits workers, it is nevertheless wrongfully exploitative. (shrink)

Julia Annas is one of the few modern writers on virtue that has attempted to recover the ancient idea that virtues are similar to skills. In doing so, she is arguing for a particular account of virtue, one in which the intellectual structure of virtue is analogous to the intellectual structure of practical skills. The main benefit of this skill model of virtue is that it can ground a plausible account of the moral epistemology of virtue. This benefit, though, is (...) only available to some accounts of virtue. Annas claims that Aristotle rejects this skill model of virtue, and so the model of virtues as a skill that Annas endorses for the modern virtue theory is Socratic. This paper argues that while Aristotle rejects the Socratic model of virtue as a skill, he does not reject the model of virtue as a skill altogether. Annas has mischaracterized Aristotle's position on the skill model, because she has not recognized that Aristotle endorses a different account of the structure of skill than the one put forth by Socrates. In addition, recent research on expertise provides an account of skills very much at odds with the description of skills offered by Annas, but similar to the account endorsed by Aristotle. Contrary to Annas, not only is the skill model of virtue compatible with a neo-Aristotelian account of virtue, but it also appears that basing a skill model of virtue on a Socratic account of virtue is likely to prove unsuccessful. (shrink)

Though one of anti-intellectualism’s key historical figures, Henri Bergson’s thought has not played a significant role in ongoing discussions of that topic. This paper attempts to help change this situation by discussing the notion at the centre of Bergson’s anti-intellectualism (namely, intuition) alongside the notion at the centre of a central form of contemporary anti-intellectualism (namely, know-how or skill). In doing so, it focuses on perhaps the most common objection to both Bergson and contemporary anti-intellectualists: that their anti-intellectualisms are rather (...) forms of irrationalism. It argues that in fact only a narrow charge of irrationalism applies to Bergsonian intuition and that a form of contemporary anti-intellectualism may offer help in responding to this remaining accusation. (shrink)

These days almost everyone seems to think it obvious that equality of opportunity is at least part of what constitutes a fair society. At the same time they are so vague about what equality of opportunity actually amounts to that it can begin to look like an empty term, a convenient shorthand for the way jobs should be allocated, whatever that happens to be. Matt Cavanagh offers a highly provocative and original new view, suggesting that the way we think about (...) equality and opportunity should be radically changed. (shrink)

This paper argues for a reinterpretation of the skill analogy in virtue ethics. It argues that the skill analogy should not be understood as proposing that being virtuous is analogous to possessing a practical skill but, rather, as proposing that being virtuous is analogous to being a good occupant of a skill-involving role. The paper argues for this by engaging with various standard objections to the analogy, two recent defences of it, and Aristotle’s treatment of it in developing his account (...) of virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics. It aims to show that neither virtue nor the skill analogy is correctly understood without recourse to the notion of a role and that once we have recourse to that notion, many objections to the analogy are met. (shrink)

The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology – namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology – that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through (...) these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically, rational Bayesian models are significantly unconstrained, both because they are uninformed by a wide range of process-level data and because their assumptions about the environment are generally not grounded in empirical measurement. The psychological implications of most Bayesian models are also unclear. Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial, but strong assumptions are often embedded in the hypothesis sets and the approximation algorithms used to derive model predictions, without a clear delineation between psychological commitments and implementational details. Comparing multiple Bayesian models of the same task is rare, as is the realization that many Bayesian models recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories. Despite the expressive power of current Bayesian models, we argue they must be developed in conjunction with mechanistic considerations to offer substantive explanations of cognition. We lay out several means for such an integration, which take into account the representations on which Bayesian inference operates, as well as the algorithms and heuristics that carry it out. We argue this unification will better facilitate lasting contributions to psychological theory, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued previous theoretical movements. (shrink)

Is libertarianism a progressive doctrine, or a reactionary one? Does libertarianism promise to liberate the poor and the marginalized from the yoke of state oppression, or does talk of "equal liberty" obscure the ways in which libertarian doctrines serve the interests of the rich and powerful? Through an examination of the history of libertarianism, this book argues that the answer is (and always has been): both. In this book we explore the neglected 19th century roots of libertarianism to show that (...) it emerged first as a radical and progressive doctrine. Libertarianism took a conservative turn in the 20th century primarily as a reaction against the rise of state socialism. Now, with international communism no longer a threat, libertarianism is in the midst of an identity crisis, with progressive and reactionary elements struggling to claim the doctrine as their own, most notably on issues of race. This book tells the history of libertarianism through an examination of six defining themes: private property, skepticism of authority, free markets, individualism, spontaneous order, and individual liberty. In doing so, it reveals that history to be longer, wider, and considerably more diverse than is commonly believed. It is a history full of internal tensions, idiosyncratic personalities, and surprising arguments. It is a history of the men (and sometimes women) who called themselves: The Individualists. (shrink)

Modern physics has provided a range of motivations for holding time to be fundamentally undirected. But how does a temporally adirectional metaphysics, or ‘C-theory’ of time, fit with the time of experience? In this chapter, I look at what kind of problem human time poses for C-theories. First, I ask whether there is a ‘hard problem’ of human time: whether it is in principle impossible to have the kinds of experience we do in a temporally adirectional world. Second I consider (...) the ‘easy problem’: how specific directed aspects of our temporal experience are to be explained by C-theorists. This leads to a greater issue: is there such a thing as an experience of time direction at all to even be explained? I show how the kinds of experience we have that we typically associate with the idea of time being directed can be accommodated within a directionless picture of time. (shrink)

:This essay seeks to defend the claim that political philosophy ought to be appropriately guided by the phenomenon of politics that it seeks to both offer a theory of and, especially in its normative guise, offer a theory for. It does this primarily through the question of political values. It begins by arguing that for any value to qualify as a value for the political domain, it must be intelligible in relation to the constitutive features of politics as a human (...) activity. It then examines the extent to which the preconditions for the realization of values in practice ought to figure in our considerations as to whether they are values that fit or belong to our social world. We can understand these parts of the essay as responding to two related questions, respectively: Is this a political value at all? — which is to ask, is it a value that is appropriate for the political realm?; and then Is this a political value for us? The final section responds to the often-made complaint that political philosophy ought not to make any concessions to the actual world of politics as it really is, arguing that attending to the realities of politics, and in particular the constitutive conditions of political activity, gives meaning to the enterprise as the theorization of politics. Furthermore those same conditions provide the limits of intelligibility beyond which ideals and values can no longer be, in any meaningful sense, ideals and values for the political sphere. (shrink)

On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your current (...) limitations. A similar story applies to virtue acquisition, as moral failures will be a part of anyone’s life, and we will all have to learn from these experiences. However, despite the importance of being able to learn from our mistakes, this is very difficult in practice, given that failure of any kind can be distressing, and especially so for moral failure. The distress created by a recognition of moral failure often prompts responses of anger, avoidance, or defensiveness; rather than attempts to make amends and when necessary to work on self-improvement. The most potentially distressing response to moral failure is shame, as it is often associated with defensiveness. It is here where emotion regulation will be important to manage that distress, and I focus on the skill of emotion differentiation. I argue that emotion differentiation is a promising strategy for distinguishing the emotions we may experience in the wake of failure, including shame, and to encourage those emotions that motivate self-improvement. Thus, emotion regulation is important for virtue acquisition. (shrink)

Some philosophers claim that propositions are simple—i.e., lack parts. In this paper, I argue that this claim is mistaken. I start with the widely accepted claim that propositions are the objects of beliefs. Then I argue that the objects of beliefs have parts. Thus, I conclude that propositions are not simple. My argument for the claim that the objects of beliefs have parts derives from the fact that beliefs are productive and systematic. This fact lurks in the background of debates (...) about the metaphysics of propositions. But its import for these debates has yet to be fully appreciated. So here I bring the point to the fore, and thus make manifest a powerful argument against simple propositions. (shrink)